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JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT
This is an appeal by Robert and Joan Debry from a final
order of the Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable Pat B.
Brian, granting summary judgment to the defendants Salt Lake
County and Wallace R. Noble.
A)•

(The order is attached as Appendix

The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal

pursuant to the provisions of §78-2-2(3)(j), Utah Code.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The following issues are presented for determination in this
appeal:
1.

Whether Salt Lake County owes a duty to the Debrys

separate from its duty to the public at large in administering
the Uniform Building Code.
2.

Whether the District Court correctly ruled that the

County and its building official are immune from suit pursuant to
the provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act, §63-3 0-1 et.
seq. Utah Code.
3.

Whether the District Court correctly ruled that the

Governmental Immunity Act does not violate the provisions of
Article 1 §11 of the Utah Constitution.
4.

Whether the District Court correctly ruled that the

DeBrys had not sufficiently pled a cause of action in fraud
against the County's building official, Wallace R. Noble, in his
individual capacity.

1

5.

Whether the District Court correctly ruled that the

County had not violated the DeBry's 1st, 5th, and 14th amendment
rights under the United States Constitution.
6.

Whether the District Court granted summary judgment

prematurely.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing an appeal from a summary judgment this Court
resolves only legal issues, and does not defer to the trial
court's rulings.

"The Court determines only whether the trial

court erred in applying the governing law and whether the trial
court correctly held that there were no disputed issues of
material fact." Ferree v. State.1

DETERMINATIVE LAW
The County relies on Article 1 §11 Utah Constitution and
Sections 63-30-3, 4, and 10 of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act
in effect at the time this action was instituted.

The complete

text of these provisions is set forth in Appendix B.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature Of The Case.
In December of 1985 the DeBrys finalized their purchase a

newly constructed building located in the unincorporated area of

1

784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989).
2

Salt Lake County.

They subsequently discovered alleged defects

in the building and brought an action for damages against, inter
alia, the sellers, the contractor, numerous subcontractors and
suppliers, the architect, the designer, the real estate company,
the lenders, the mortgage company, the title company, Salt Lake
County, and its building official, Wallace Ray Noble.
This appeal involves only Salt Lake County and Mr. Noble.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the District Court.
The District Court granted summary judgment to Salt Lake

County and its building official, Wallace Ray Noble, ruling that
they were immune from suit pursuant to the provisions of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act; that the Act was not unconstitutional;
and that the Debrys had not been deprived of their 1st, 5th, and
14th amendment rights.
The District Court also granted summary judgment to Wallace
R. Noble individually, ruling that the Debrys had not pled an
action in fraud with sufficient specificity.

The District Court

granted the DeBry's motion for 54(b) certification making the
order of summary judgment a final order. (R. 16829).

The DeBrys

have appealed the District Court's rulings.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts of this case demonstrate the following:
1.

On November 16, 1984, upon application of Cascade

Construction, Salt Lake County issued a "footings and foundation

3

permit" for a commercial building to be constructed at 4 252 South
700 East in the unincorporated area of Salt Lake County.

(R.

2243; 4039).
2.

On or about May 30, 1985, during construction of the

building, the DeBrys signed an earnest money sales agreement to
purchase the building from Cascade Construction. (R. 2428; 3436).
3.

On December 6, 1985, at the request of Del Bartel and

Cascade Construction, and in reliance upon statements made by
Bartel that all necessary permits for the building had been
obtained by Cascade Construction, the Building Official of Salt
Lake County issued a temporary, 3 0-day certificate of occupancy
for the building.
4.

(Attached as Appendix C ) .

(R. 2068; R-3768).

As of December 6, 1985, the Building Official had never

before met Del Bartel, nor had he met or had any conversations or
contact with the plaintiffs, Robert and Joan DeBry.
5.

(R. 3 768).

The Building Official observed that the building was

not complete on December 6th, but based upon an inspection that
had just been performed by another County inspector, determined
that there appeared to be no substantial hazard that would result
from allowing temporary occupancy of the building for 3 0 days
while the building was being completed and brought into
compliance with code requirements. (R. 3768).
6.

The DeBrys closed their purchase of the building on or

about December 10, 1985, knowing that the building was not

4

complete and that additional work on the building was still
needed. (R. 3452-61).
7.

Subsequent to issuing the temporary, 30-day certificate

of occupancy, the County determined that a building permit had
never been issued to Cascade Construction for other than the
construction of the footings and foundation. (R. 2242; 3769).
8.

On or about March 17, 1986, Salt Lake County performed

a partial inspection of the property and informed the Debrys by
letter dated March 19, 1986 of the minimum deficiencies contained
in the building that needed

to be corrected before a certificate

of occupancy would be issued. (Attached as Appendix D ) .

(R. 3772-

74).
9.

On May 15, 1986 the DeBrys were again notified by the

County that they were occupying the building without a valid
certificate of occupancy and were again requested to obtain a
building permit.
10.

(Attached as Appendix E ) .

(R. 3775).

On or about October 20, 1986 the DeBrys served the

County with an affidavit of Kenneth William Karren, Jr., a state
licensed civil engineer, in which he stated that he had inspected
the building and had identified serious violations of the Uniform
Building Code in the building.

(R. 2146; 27212) .

The affidavit of Mr. Karren at R. 2146 is substantially
similar, though not as detailed, to the affidavit received by the
County on Nov. 20, 1986.
5

11.

Based in part upon this affidavit, the County concluded

that the building constituted a hazard to the life and safety of
the occupants of the building and served the DeBrys with a Notice
and Order to Vacate the building dated November 3, 1986.
(Attached as Appendix F ) .
12.

(R. 2721; 3776).

The order was additionally issued due to the fact the

DeBrys had failed to correct code violations, submit as-built
plans, obtain a building permit, obtain a certificate of
occupancy, and pay required fees.

The Notice and Order outlined

the conditions upon which Salt Lake County would perform a final
inspection so that a certificate of occupancy could be issued (R.
3776).
13.

The Debrys appealed the notice and order to the Salt

Lake County Board of Appeals, which heard the matter on December
12, 1986.
14.

(R. 2724-25).
The Board denied the DeBrys1 request for an extension

of time in which to vacate the building, and refused to order the
Building Official to make additional inspections until the DeBrys
had complied with the provisions of the Notice and Order.
(Attached as Appendix G ) .
15.

(R. 2724-25).

The DeBrys petitioned the Utah Court of Appeals for

direct appellate review of the Board's decision.

6

The Court of

Appeals dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.3

No other

appellate relief was sought by the DeBrys.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Salt Lake County owes no duty to the DeBrys in the
administration of the Uniform Building Code.

The DeBrys can not

establish "negligence" until they first establish a "duty" owed
to them by the County.

The only duty the County owes the DeBrys,

in this case, is the duty the County owes to the public at large.
The District Court correctly granted summary judgment in
this action on the basis of governmental immunity.

This Court

has consistently held that the issuance of orders, certificates,
and permits, and the making of inspections by government
employees are governmental functions.

These activities are

specifically listed as exceptions to the legislative waiver of
governmental immunity in §63-30-10 of the Act.
The Governmental Immunity Act is not unconstitutional under
the provisions of Article I §11 of the Utah State Constitution,
the "open courts" provision.

This Court has previously upheld

the constitutionality of the Act against an Article I §11
challenge.
The District Court correctly ruled that the DeBrys had
failed

3

to plead an action in fraud with sufficient particularity

DeBrv v. Salt Lake County, 764 P.2d 627 (Utah App. 1988).
7

against the County's building official, in his individual
capacity, to withstand a motion for summary judgment.
The District Court correctly ruled that the DeBrys1 1st,
5th, and 14th amendment rights were not violated by the County
when the County ordered the DeBrys to vacate the building.

The

Notice and Order was based on the DeBrys1 failure to obtain a
certificate of occupancy and on their submission of an affidavit
of a licensed engineer stating that the building contained
serious building code violations.
The District Court did not grant summary judgment
prematurely.

The DeBrys1 did not object to the court hearing the

County's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that
discovery had not been completed.

In fact the DeBrys argued

their own motion for summary judgment at the same time,,

A

request for additional discovery was never raised, nor was there
a request or notice for additional discovery outstanding at the
time the District Court granted summary judgment.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
SALT LAKE COUNTY CANNOT BE LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENCE
BECAUSE IT OWES NO DUTY TO THE DEBRYS.
Before the DeBrys can establish negligence on the part of
the County, they must first establish that the County owed them a

8

duty of care in administering the Uniform Building Code.

This

Court recently reaffirmed its adherence to the "public duty
doctrine" in Ferree v. State.5 by holding:
"For a governmental agency and its agents to
be liable for negligently caused injury
suffered by a member of the public, the
plaintiff must show a breach of a duty owed
him as an individual, not merely the breach
of an obligation owed to the general public
at large by the governmental official."
(Emphasis added). Id. at 151.
In accord is Taylor v. Stevens County6 where the
Washington Supreme Court held:
"We hold that Stevens County cannot be
held liable for its alleged negligence in
administering its building code. The duty to
ensure that buildings comply with county and
municipal building codes rests with individual
builders, developers and permit applicants,
not local government." (Emphasis added). Id.
at 449.
That Court then reiterated its previous adherence to the
rule by stating:
"This court and the Court of Appeals has
on numerous occasions rejected the contention
that building codes impose a duty upon local
governments to enforce the provisions of such
codes
for
the
benefit
of
individuals.
(Citations omitted.)
* * * [T]he duty to
issue building permits and conduct inspections
is to protect the health and safety of the
general public. Accordingly, we continue to
adhere to the traditional public duty rule
4

Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P. 2d 413, 415 (Utah 1986).

5

784 P.2d 149, (Utah 1989).

6

759 P.2d 447, (Wash. 1988).
9

that building codes impose duties that are
owed to the public at large," (Emphasis
added) . Id, at 45o"7
The DeBrys have not alleged that the County owes them
a duty other than as members of the general public.

Paragraph 41

of DeBrys1 complaint alleges that the County had a duty to
enforce the Uniform Building Code which was "promulgated for the
protection of plaintiffs and other members of the general public"
(R. 3385)•

Paragraph 46 of their complaint alleges the County

failed to warn the DeBrys "and other members of the general
public of defects in the building". (R. 3386).

These broad

allegations are insufficient to impose a duty of due Ccire on the
County.
Absent a showing by the DeBrys that the County owes them a
special duty, the DeBrys have no cause of action against the
County.

In Lakeside Condominium "C" Association v. Fre^diani

Developers, Inc.,8 a case directly on point, the plaintiffs sued
the Village of Lakeside for negligent enforcement of its building
code.

In affirming the dismissal of the action the Illinois

Appellate Court held:
"The law is clear that there is no common
law duty to members of the general public for
a municipality's
failure to enforce
an
ordinance.
Liability arises only when a
special duty is owed to the particular
See also Siple v. City of Topeka, 679 P.2d 190, 195 (Kan.
1984). "Inspection laws do not create a duty to an individual."
8

482 N.E.2d 665, (111. App. 1 Dist. 1985).
10

plaintiff different from that owed to the
public at large.
(Citations omitted.)
A
special duty arises when the entity steps out
of its governmental function and acts in a
private capacity or develops a "relationship"
to the plaintiff."
(Emphasis added). Id at
666.
The DeBrys have not established that the County acted in a
"private capacity" or that such a special "relationship" exists
between themselves and the County.

They do not even allege that

Mr. Noble made any representations directly to them regarding the
building prior to their purchase of it.

Mr. Noble's affidavit is

uncontroverted that at the time he issued the temporary
certificate of occupancy, he did not know the DeBrys and had
never spoken to them. (R. 3768).

The record contains no facts

that establish a special relationship between the DeBrys and the
County.
In addressing the special relationship exception in the
context of building inspections, the Washington Supreme Court
Taylor, supra held:
[T]he special relationship exception to the
public duty doctrine has no application where
a claimant alleges negligent enforcement of
building codes because local government owes
no duty of care to ensure compliance with the
codes. (Emphasis added) Id. at 452.
This Court in Ferree stated:
"To adopt plaintiffs1 theories would
impose too broad a duty of care on the part of
corrections officers toward individual members
of the public." Id. at 151.

11

in

The rationale of Ferree is controlling, and based on the
cases cited above, its holding should be extended by determining
that local governments owe no duty to individual members of the
public in the administration of local building codes.9
POINT II
THE DEBRYS1 CLAIMS AGAINST SALT LAKE COUNTY
ARE BARRED BY THE PROVISIONS OF THE
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT, S63-30-1. ET SEP.,
UTAH CODE.
The DeBrys1 action against the County fails due to the
provisions of Utah's Governmental Immunity Act.10

Section 63-30-

3, Utah Code, provides in part:
"Except as may be otherwise provided in
this chapter, all governmental entities are
immune from suit for any injury which results
from a governmental function."
In 1980 the Supreme Court in Standiford v. Salt Lake City
Corp.11 adopted a new standard for determining governmental
immunity under this section.

The Court held that the test is:

"...whether the activity under consideration
is of such a unique nature that it can only be
performed by a governmental agency or that it
is essential to the core of governmental
activity." Id. at 1236, 1237.

9

If the Court determines that the County owes no duty of care
to the plaintiffs, it "need not reach the questions raised by the
doctrine of sovereign immunity". Xd. at 152.
10

§63-30-1, et seq., Utah Code.

11

605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980).

12

Following Standiford the inquiry as to whether immunity
existed depended upon whether the activity at issue constituted a
"governmental function."

The issue before the Court is whether

the acts of issuing certificates, permits and orders, and
conducting inspections are governmental functions and therefore
immune.

This Court has repeatedly held that the activities

listed in Section 10 of the Act are governmental functions for
which governmental entities and their employees are immune from
suit.

Section 63-30-10 of the Act in effect at the time this

action was filed, provides in part:
"Immunity from suit of all governmental
entities is waived for injury proximately
caused by a negligent act or omission of an
employee committed within the scope of
employment except if the injury:...
(c) Arises out of the issuance, denial,
suspension, or revocation of, or by the
failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or
revoke, any permit, license, certificate,
approval, order, or similar authorization; or
(d) Arises out of a failure to make an
inspection
or
by
reason
of making
an
inadequate or negligent inspection of any
property; or...
(f) Arises out of a misrepresentation by
the employee whether or not it is negligent or
intentional...." (Emphasis added.)
In Condemarin v. University Hospital,12 Justice Durham wrote
that the activities excepted in §63-30-10(1) (a) through (1) are

12

775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989).
13

all governmental functions and therefore immune from suit:
"In addition, immunity of governmental
entities is waived for injuries caused by
employee negligence committed within the scope
of employment except where the injuries arise
out of certain specific activities listed in
§63-30-10(1)(a)
to
(1).
Each
of
the
activities
listed
in
Section
10
is,
interestingly,
within
the
'core1
of
governmental
functions
discussed
in
Standiford. Each is of 'such a unique nature
that
it
can
only
be
performed
by
a
governmental agency or that it is essential to
the
core
of
governmental
activity,'
Standiford, 605 P. 2d at 1237."
(Emphasis
added). Id. at 350.
The DeBrys claim that the County and its employees were
negligent in issuing a building permit, negligent in issuing a
certificate of occupancy, and negligent in conducting inspections
of the property.

Even if Debrys' allegations were true, Section

10 of the Governmental Immunity Act retains the County's immunity
from suit for the negligent issuance of a permit or for the
performance of negligent inspections.
In a per curiam opinion issued prior to Condemarin, supra,
in Metropolitan Finance v. State of Utah,13 this Court held that
activities specified in Section 10 of the Governmental Immunity
Act were "governmental functions" and affirmed a grant of summary
judgment in favor of the State Tax Commission.

Employees of the

Motor Vehicle Division had erroneously issued a certificate of

13

714 P.2d 293 (Utah 1986).

title for a motor vehicle to someone other than the owner.

The

Court held:
"We need only observe that the statutory
waiver of immunity for negligence does not
apply when plaintiff's alleged injury arises
out of the issuance of title certificates or
the misrepresentations
or omissions of
defendant's employees (citation of section 6330-10)
and
plaintiff's
allegations
of
negligence
and
conspiracy
are
clearly
circumscribed
within
these...statutory
exceptions to any immunity waiver.
Therefore, even assuming that the facts
alleged
by
plaintiff
are
true,
the
Governmental Immunity Act does not waive
immunity from suit for the negligent or
intentional performance by defendants of these
governmental functions. The summary judgment
against plaintiff is affirmed."
(Emphasis
added.) Id. at 294, 295.
Finally, in Gillman v. Dept. of Financial Inst.,14 this
Court again upheld a summary judgment on the basis of
governmental immunity in a negligence action brought against the
state for failing to revoke a license of a thrift institution
after inspecting the institution's records.

The plaintiff in

Gillman attempted to draft the complaint to bring each cause of
action within the waiver provisions of Section 10 of the Immunity
Act. The Court dismissed those claims and held:
"An examination of Gillman's arguments in
detail demonstrates that, at their heart, all
are futile attempts to obscure the fact that
the claims asserted are for injuries arising
out of licensing decisions allegedly made in
a negligent fashion. As such they are all
782 P.2d 506 (Utah 1989).
15

immune from suit under section 63-30-10(3) .f"
(Emphasis added). Id. at 509.
The Court concluded by adopting the following policy reasons
articulated by the California Law Revision Commission for
upholding the Governmental Immunity Act:
"Public entities and public employees
should not be liable for failure to make
arrests or otherwise to enforce any law. They
should not be liable for failing to inspect
persons or property adequately to determine
compliance with health and safety regulations.
Nor should they be liable for negligent or
wrongful issuance or revocation of licenses
and permits.
The government has undertaken
these activities to insure public health and
safety.
To provide the utmost
public
protection, governmental entities should not
be dissuaded from engaging in such activities
by the fear that liability may be imposed if
an employee performs his duties inadequately..
Moreover, if liability existed for this type
of activity, the risk exposure to which a
public entity would be subject would include
virtually all activities going on within the
c ommun i ty.
There
would
be
potential
government liability for all building defects,
for all crimes, and for all outbreaks of
contagious disease.
No private person is
subjected to risks of this magnitude.... Far
more persons would suffer if government did
not perform these functions at all than would
be benefitted by permitting recovery in those
cases where the government is shown to have
performed inadequately.
(Emphasis added).
Id. at 512, 513.
The issuance of permits and certificates, and the conducting
of inspections are governmental functions for which immunity has
expressly been retained pursuant to Section 10 of the Act.

16

The

DeBrys1 action is therefore barred by the Governmental Immunity
Act.
The DeBrys have cited numerous cases from other
jurisdictions in support of their argument that the County should
be held liable for making negligent inspections.

These cases are

uniformly from jurisdictions which have a different statutory
framework than Utah!s.

However, the major fallacy of the DeBrys1

argument is that they totally ignore Utah law regarding
governmental immunity, as set forth in this Court's most recent
decisions.

No mention is made of the dispositive cases of

Gillman, Condemarin, Metropolitan Finance or Loveland v. Orem

DeBrys also argue that material issues of fact exist which
preclude summary judgment.

Their argument is without merit

because the determination of what activities constitute
governmental functions are legal issues to be determined by the
courts; they are not issues of fact as the cases cited above
clearly demonstrate.
POINT III
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT DOES NOT VIOLATE
ARTICLE I Sll OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
This Court has previously upheld the constitutionality of
the Governmental Immunity Act against an Article I §11 challenge.

15

746 P.2d 763 (Utah 1987), infra.
17

In Madsen v. Borthick,

this Court held:

"Sovereign immunity—the principle that
the state cannot be sued in its own courts
without its consent—was a well-settled
principle of American common law at the time
Utah became a state*. (Citations omitted) .
Article 1 §11 of the Utah Constitution, which
prescribes that all courts shall be open and
persons shall not be barred from using them to
redress injuries, was not meant to create a
new remedy or a new right of action,
(Citation omitted). Consequently, Article 1.
Sll worked no change in the principle of
sovereign immunity, and sovereign immunity is
not unconstitutional under that section. It
was so held in Brown v. Wichita State
University, 219 Kan. 2, 8-12, 547 P.2d 1015,
1022-24 (1976), which involved a similar
provision of the Kansas Constitution.
We
concur in the reasoning and result of the
decision." (Emphasis added) Id. at 629.
Counties and local governments were also clothed with
sovereign immunity in the performance of governmental functions
17

at statehood.

18

The DeBrys so concede.

.

Since both state and

local governments enjoyed sovereign immunity at the time of
statehood then the provisions of Article I §11 do not deny the
DeBrys any right of action under the state constitution.

The

DeBrys admit that in order to prevail this Court must ireverse the
holding of the District Court and find that the issuing of

10

658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983).

17

Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 63 L. Ed 2d 673,
689-691.
18

Appellant's Brief p. 17.

orders, permits, and certificates, and making inspections are
"proprietary" rather than "governmental" functions.19

However,

as demonstrated in Point II, this Court has repeatedly held that
these activities are "governmental functions".
The DeBrys further argue that to the extent the governmental
immunity act prohibits a cause of action against the County's
building official, except for fraud or malice, it violates the
provisions of Article 1 §11.20

This argument was also rejected

by the Court in Madsen, supra.

After considering the

implications of Article I §11, this Court specifically upheld the
constitutionality of the 1978 amendments to the Act which
extended immunity to governmental employees acting within the
scope of their employment, except as specifically authorized by
the Act.21
Since Madsen, this Court has decided two additional cases
involving Article I §11 claims:

Berry By and Through Berry v.

Beech Aircraft22 and Condemarin v. University Hospital, supra.
In Berry the Court stated:

Appellants1 brief p.18.
20

§63-30-4 (3) & (4) provide that a governmental employee may
be joined in a representative capacity in a suit against the
entity, but may not be held personally liable except for fraud or
malice. The complete text is set forth in Appendix B.
21

Id. at 633.

22

717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985).
19

11

[N] either the due process nor the open
courts provision constitutionalizes the common
law or otherwise freezes the law governing
private rights and remedies as of the time of
statehood. *** It is, in fact, one of the
important functions of the Legislature to
change and modify the law that governs
relations between individuals as society
evolves and conditions require.
***

[S]ection 11 rights are not always
paramount, either.
They do not sweep all
other constitutional rights and prerogatives
before
them.
They,
too,
like many
constitutional rights, must be weighed against
and harmonized with other constitutional
provisions. The accommodation of competing,
and sometimes clashing, constitutional rights
and prerogatives is a task of the greatest
delicacy, although a common and necessary one
in constitutional adjudication. Id. at 676677.
The County agrees with the two part test this Court adopted
in Berry as set forth in the Appellantfs brief at page 15.
However, the County submits that the DeBrys1 arguments satisfy
neither element of the test.

First, the Act does not totally ban

all causes of action or grant absolute immunity to either
government entities or to their employees.23

The Act generally

waives governmental immunity except for specified activities.
Immunity for governmental entities is also waived for employee
negligence committed within the scope of employment, except for
the specified activities listed in Section 10 of the Act.
Employees may still be sued in a representative capacity for

" Hansen v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 838, 845-846 (Utah
1990).

nongovernmental functions and individually for acts of fraud or
malice.
Second, sound policy reasons exist for granting immunity to
government entities and their employees in performing
governmental functions.

These policy considerations were adopted

by this Court in Gillman, supra and are set forth in Point II at
pages 16.
POINT IV
THE DEBRYS' COMPLAINT FAILS TO ALLEGE A CAUSE OF ACTION
IN FRAUD AGAINST THE COUNTY'S BUILDING OFFICIAL
FOR WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED.
Rule 9(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, requires that all
matters alleging fraud be stated with particularity.

This Court

has held:
"'Fraud1 or 'fraudulent1 are terms of
uncertain meaning. There are conclusions that
must be flushed out by elaboration and by
consideration of the context in which they are
used. This is why Rule 9(b) requires that the
circumstances constituting fraud fshall be
stated with particularity,' a requirement we
have construed to require allegation of the
substance of the acts constituting the alleged
wrong." Williams v. State Farm Insurance Co.,
656 P.2d 966, 972 (Utah 1982).
An essential element of proving fraud is the requirement
"that a representation must be made knowingly, willfully, and
with intent to deceive."24

The Debrys have not pled that Mr.

Noble made any representation to them regarding their purchase of

24

Duqan v. Jones. 615 P.2d 1239, 1246 (Utah 1980).
21

the building, let alone a statement made by him with the intent
to deceive.

The DeBrys aver that "the signed temporary

certificate of occupancy was a representation to the citizens of
Salt Lake County...." only. (R. 3387).
without more, clothed with immunity.25

Such representations are,
Governments are immune

from suit for injuries arising out of:
"a misrepresentation by the employee whether
or not it is negligent or intentional;26
The principle of law governing the deficiencies in the
Debrys1 complaint was set forth by the Utah Supreme Court in
Davis Stock Co. v. Hill,27.

In upholding the dismissal of an

amended complaint for failure to state a cause of action for
fraud the Court held:
"This court has several times held that
one of the basic elements of pleading a cause
of action based upon fraud is the materiality
of the alleged false representation.
In
certain instances the pleader can meet this
requirement
by
simply
alleging
the
representation and its falsity for by the very
nature of the representation it must be either
true or false in its entirety.
Classic
examples in this regard include some matters
of status and such matters as blood lines. A
person is either married or he is not; a horse
is either a thoroughbred or it is not. But in
the great majority of cases the materiality of
a false representation cannot be ascertained
Loveland v. Orem City Corp. , 746 P.2d 763 (Utah 1987). City
was immune for representations made to plaintiffs regarding the
condition of land pursuant to §63-30-10 subparagraphs (c) & (f).
26

§63-30-10(6) Utah Code

27

268 P.2d 988, 2 U.2d 20 (Utah 1954).
22

unless
the
true
fact
is alleged
with
particularity.
In the instant case the significance of
the
alleged
misrepresentation
cannot
be
ascertained in the absence of knowledge of the
true facts. Roofs ordinarily leak and heating
plants fail to be "in excellent condition" in
degrees
rather
than
in
toto.
Misrepresentations relative to fuel bills,
gross income and operating expenses may be of
so little importance as to fall within the
rule of de
minimis,
or of so great a
significance as to be the proper basis of an
action for fraud.
The materiality of the
allegations is dependent upon the true facts.
The trial court properly held that the
complaint did not state a claim in fraud."
(Emphasis added). Ijd. at 989, 990.
In the present case, the DeBrys allege that by issuing a
temporary certificate of occupancy Mr. Noble fraudulently
represented to the "general public" the following: (a) the
possession by the County of approved plans; (b) the issuance of a
valid building permit; (c) that all inspections required had been
performed on the property; (d) that no work on the property had
proceeded beyond the point indicated in each successive
inspection; (e) that all work on the building had been done in
accordance with approved plans; and (f) a special finding by the
Building Official that no substantial hazard would result from
occupancy of the building. (R. 3387-3388).
The County did issue a footings and foundations permit based
on submitted plans. (R. 4039).

It performed at least one

inspection and in addition, the Building Official made a finding
that, in his opinion, no substantial hazard would result by
23

allowing limited occupancy of the substantially completed
building for thirty days. (R. 3768).

The certificate of

occupancy was specific in its terms and it imposed additional
requirements which were to have been performed within the 3 0 day
occupancy period. (R. 3768).

None of the requirements were

completed by either the contractor or the DeBrys within the time
frame required by the certificate.
The DeBrys knew that the building was incomplete at the time
that the temporary certificate of occupancy was issued and at the
time they closed on the building.

They knew additional work was

needed to completed the building and that occupancy of the
building had been permitted for only 3 0 days.

In light of this

knowledge, they could not have relied on the temporary
certificate for any more than what its express language stated:
"OK for temporary occupancy for 30 days....11 (R.

3116),

That the County has been alleged to have been negligent in
conducting the review process for this building regarding permits
and inspections does not constitute fraud on the part of Mr.
Noble.
On a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party
cannot merely rely on its pleadings, but has a duty:
"to make a showing sufficient to establish
the existence of an element essential to that

24

party's case, and on which that party will
bear the burden of proof at trial." 28
Otherwise there can be no genuine issue of material fact.

It was

therefore incumbent upon the DeBrys, at the time of hearing on
the County's motion for summary judgment, to establish that a
misrepresentation was made to them directly by Mr. Noble, which
was false, upon which they relied to their detriment, and which
was sufficient to abrogate Mr. Noble's immunity under §63-3010(f) of the Immunity Act.

This they failed to do and the

District Court correctly granted summary judgment to Mr. Noble.

POINT V
SALT LAKE COUNTY DID NOT VIOLATE THE DEBRYS1
1ST, 5TH, OR 14TH AMENDMENT RIGHTS
IN ADMINISTERING THE UNIFORM BUILDING CODE
The essence of the DeBrys' constitutional claim is that they
were denied a property interest in their building without due
process of law.

In paragraphs 58 and 59 of their complaint the

DeBrys allege that "as a direct result of the notice to vacate"
the County "wrongfully deprived [them] of the use of their
building" and "that their freedom of enterprise and occupation
has been taken away". (R. 3390).

Reeves v. Geicrv Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764 P.2d 636, 642
(Utah App. 1988); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett. 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986); Abernethy v. Smith. 498 P.2d 175, 182 (Ariz. App. 1972).
25

The DeBrys had no reasonable expectation of a property
interest in the occupancy of the building because they failed to
comply with the conditions precedent for obtaining a certificate
of occupancy.

As of the date of the Notice to Vacate they had no

approved plans for the building, had not obtained a building
permit, had not paid required fees, had not obtained a final
inspection, and had not corrected known code violations. The
DeBrys made no showing that they were entitled to a certificate
of occupancy or that the County had wrongfully withheld the
issuance of one.

The DeBrys were occupying the building in

violation of the law.

Therefore the DeBrys were not wirongfully

deprived of any property right.
However, a review of the record demonstrates that the DeBrys
were nevertheless accorded due process regarding the Notice to
Vacate.

Once the County became aware that the building had been

constructed without the required approved plans and building
permit, the County notified both the contractor and the DeBrys on
several occasions to bring the building into compliance with the
requirements of the Uniform Building Code. (R. 3772, 3775).
In October of 1986 the DeBrys still had not obtained a
building permit or submitted approved plans, nor had they met any
other requirements of the building code that entitled them to
receive a final certificate of occupancy.

On October 20, 1986

the DeBrys put the County on notice that, in the sworn opinion of

26

Kenneth Karren, a state licensed engineer, the building contained
serious building code violations. Based upon the above the County
determined the building in its current state constituted a hazard
to the life and safety of its occupants and served the DeBrys
with a Notice and Order to Vacate the building. (R. 2146, 2721).
The DeBrys then appealed the Notice to Vacate to the
County's Board of Appeals, which denied the DeBrys1 request for
additional time to vacate and ordered the DeBrys to vacate the
building. (R. 2724).

The DeBrys then appealed the board f s

decision to the Utah Court of Appeals.29
The County respectfully submits that the administrative and
judicial review available to the DeBrys after the issuance of the
Notice to Vacate accorded them full due process of law regarding
all of their claimed "property interests" in the use of the
building and in the pursuit of their occupation.30
Based upon the DeBrys1 pleadings, the filed affidavits and
arguments of counsel, the District Court specifically ruled:
"The Court further finds that the plaintiffs
have not been deprived of their First, Fifth
or Fourteenth Amendment rights under the
United States Constitution by virtue of Salt
Lake County's having issued a Notice and Order
to Vacate the plaintiff's premises." (R4244) .

^ DeBrv v. Salt Lake County, 764 P. 2d 627 (Utah App. 1988).
The Court of Appeals dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction
and the DeBrys did not seek any further judicial review.
30

Mathews v. Eldredge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
27

The District Court did not rule, as the DeBrys now argue, that
the County was "immune from the DeBrys1 constitutional claims".31
On appeal the DeBrys now abandon the constitutional
arguments they made to the District Court and approach the issue
from an entirely different tack.

They present two entirely

different arguments for the first time on appeal contrary to the
principles of appellate review.32

First, they argue that their

constitutional rights were impinged because the County issued the
notice to vacate the building "as retaliation for the DeBrys
filing a complaint...against the County."33

Second, they argue

that it was the County's alleged failure to enforce the Uniform
Building Code prior to their purchase of the building that was
the cause of their alleged constitutional deprivations.

There

is no factual or legal basis in the record to support either
argument.
As the County established in Point V herein, on the County's
motion for summary judgment, it was the DeBrys1 duty "to make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to ...[their] case and on which...[they] will bear the

31

Appellants1 brief, p. 41.

32

Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938, 944, (Utah 1987): "Matters
not raised at the trial court level will not be considered by this
Court on appeal."
33

Appellants brief p. 36.
28

burden of proof at trial".

The DeBrys produced no evidence at

the hearing which established either a retaliatory motive on the
part of the County or the lack of a lawful basis for issuing the
Notice to Vacate.

The DeBrys not only failed to prove these

allegations, they did not even raise them.
The United States Supreme Court has held:
"The decisions of this court from the
beginning lend no support whatever to the
assumption that the judiciary may restrain the
exercise of lawful power on the assumption
that a wrongful purpose or motive has caused
the power to be exerted."
In Point I of the County's brief, the County established it
owed no duty to the DeBrys in the enforcement of the building
code.

Since the County owes no duty to individuals in enforcing

the building code, the County did not deny the Debrys1 their
constitutional rights for allegedly failing to enforce it on
behalf of the general public.
"A municipal corporation may prohibit the
use and occupancy of certain buildings, where
the prohibition is justified as a proper
exercise of the police power to protect the
public health, safety, welfare and morals. It
may, for example, prohibit the use or
occupancy of a building or portion thereof for
failure to comply with the requirements of an
ordinance, where the owner of occupant fails,
after notice to make the building comply
therewith."
* * *

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, supra; Reeves, supra.
35

United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) citing
McCrav v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 56 (1904).
29

"Unquestionably it is the official duty
of
city
officials
charged
with
the
responsibility of administering and enforcing
municipal building codes and ordinances to
discharge that responsibility
faithfully,
exercising sound judgment where discretion is
vested in them, but courts will not interfere
with their exercise of discretion except for
abuse thereof. It has been held that mandamus
does not lie to compel a city to enforce
building regulation. Moreover, the neglect of
a municipality and its officers or employees
to enforce the detailed provisions of a
building code creates no civil liability to
individuals.11
McQuillin,
Municipal
Corporations, 3rd Ed., §24.552. 554, pp. 233,
236.
The County's enforcement of the building code constituted a
lawful exercise of its police power, not a deprivation of the
DeBrys' constitutional rights.
POINT VI
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT
GRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT PREMATURELY
At the time the Court heard the County's motion for summary
judgment, it also heard the DeBrys' motion for partial summary
judgment.

The DeBrys made no objection at the time of hearing

regarding the prematurity of either their or the County's motion,
nor did they request a continuance to conduct further discovery.
They had completed their discovery of the County several months
prior to the hearing.36

At the time summary judgment was

The DeBrys sought no additional discovery of the County
after the County responded to the DeBrys' Request for Admissions
and Interrogatory on December 4, 1986. (R. 2078).
30

entered there were no outstanding requests or notices for
additional discovery.
The DeBrys1 reliance on Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman'
is misplaced, for this Court there stated:
"[A] court should deny a motion to continue
[discovery] if the motion opposing summary
judgment is dilatory or without merit." Id. at
278.
The Arizona Court of Appeals addressed an identical
38

situation in Abernethy v. Smith.
That Court held:
"We find no merit in plaintiffs1 argument
on appeal that the granting of summary
judgment was premature and deprived them of
further discovery.
Plaintiffs had ample
opportunity...to request a continuance of the
summary judgment motions until discovery was
completed.
There is no indication in the
record that plaintiffs made such a request
and, in fact, there seems to be no complaint
registered by plaintiffs until the opening
brief. Id. at 182-183.
The DeBrys allege that further discovery would have
elicited facts that may have precluded summary judgment.

In

support thereof, they cite depositions of County employees which
were taken in 1990 as part of a separate federal court action.
These depositions were taken nearly three years after the grant
of summary judgment in this case.

They add nothing of substance

to this case; nor are they part of the record below.

740 P.2d 275 (Utah App. 1987).
498 P.2d 175, (Ariz. App. 1972).
31

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the
decision of the District Court granting Salt Lake County's and
Wallace Ray Noble's motion for summary judgment.
Dated this / £ day of

*rk&uM^,

1991.

DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney

PAUL G. MAUGHAN
Deputy County Attorney
Attorney for Appellee
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APPENDIX A

•0:11 1987

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT J, DEBRY and
JOAN DEBRY,

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS SALT
LAKE COUNTY'S, WALLACE RAY
NOBLE'S AND SALT LAKE COUNTY
PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
-VS-

Civil No. C86-553
CASCADE ENTERPRISES, et al.
Defendants.

Judge Pat B. Brian
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Lake

County

Judgment

Salt

Public
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Lake
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Department's

Motion
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the

premises

in

Present
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Summary
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Maughan,

for
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and

Court
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considered
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1.
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County,
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Public

Works

against Wallace Ray Noble, in either his official

Department
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or
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The
for
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plaintiffs
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Act.
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accordance therewith,
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defendants'
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Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as
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DISTRICT JUDGE
Order prepared by Mr. Maughan
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APPENDIX B

Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.]
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an
injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary
delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting
or defending before any tribunal in this State, by
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a
party.

1896

63-30-3. Immunity of governmental entities from
suit.
Except as may be otherwise provided in this
chapter, all governmental entities are immune from
suit for any injury which results from the exercise of
a governmental function, governmentally-owned
hospital, nursing home, or other governmental
health care facility, and from an approved medical,
nursing, or other professional health care clinical
training program conducted in either public or
private facilities.
The management of flood waters and other
natural disasters and the construction, repair, and
operation of flood and storm systems by governmental entities are considered to be governmental
functions, and governmental entities and their officers and employees are immune from suit for any
injury or damage resulting from those activities. 19»5

63-30-4. Act provisions not construed as
admission or denial of liability - Effect of waiver
of immunity - Exclusive remedy - Joinder of
employee - Limitations on personal liability.
(1) Nothing contained in this chapter, unless specifically provided, shall be construed as an admission or denial of liability or responsibility in so far
as governmental entities or their employees are
concerned. If immunity from suit is waived by this
chapter, consent to be sued is granted and liability
of the entity shall be determined as if the entity were
a private person.
(2) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as
adversely affecting any immunity from suit which a
governmental entity or employee may otherwise
assert under state or federal law.
(3) The remedy against a governmental entity or
its employee for an injury caused by an act or
omission which occurs during the performance of
such employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority is, after the effective date of this act, exclusive of any other civil
action or proceeding by reason of the same subject
matter against the employee or the estate of the
employee whose act or omission gave rise to the
claim, unless the employee acted or failed to act
through fraud or malice.
(4) An employee may be joined in an action
against a governmental entity in a representative
capacity if the act or omission complained of is one
for which the governmental entity may be liable, but
no employee may be held personally liable for acts
or omissions occurring during the performance of
the employee's duties, within the scope of employment or under color of authority, unless it is established that the employee acted or failed to act due to
fraud or malice.
19S3

by negligent act or omission of employee Exceptions - Waiver for injury caused by
violation of fourth amendment rights.
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury proximately caused by a
negligent act or omission of an employee committed
within the scope of employment except if the injury:
(a) arises out of the exercise or performance or
the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
function, whether or not the discretion is abused; or
(b) arises out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander,
deceit, interference with contract rights, infliction of
mental anguish, or civil rights; or

(c) arises out of the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of, or by the failure or refusal to
issue, deny, suspend, or revoke, any permit, license,
certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization;
or
(d) arises out of a failure to make an inspection, or by reason of making an inadequate or
negligent inspection of any property; or
(e) arises out of the institution or prosecution
of any judicial or administrative proceeding, even if
malicious or without probable cause; or
(f) arises out of a misrepresentation by the
employee whether or not it is negligent or intentional; or
(g) arises out of or results from riots* unlawful
assemblies, public demonstrations, mob violence,
and civil disturbances; or
(h) arises out of or in connection with the collection of and assessment of taxes; or
(i) arises out of the activities of the Utah National Guard; or
(j) arises out of the incarceration of any person
in any state prison, county, or city jail or other
place of legal confinement; or
(k) arises from any natural condition on state
lands or the result of any activity authorized by the
State Land Board; or
(1) arises out of the activities of providing
emergency medical assistance, fighting fire, handling
hazardous materials, or emergency evacuations.
(2) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury proximately caused or
arising out of a violation of protected fourth amendment rights as provided in Chapter 16, Title 78
which shall be the exclusive remedy for injuries to
those protected rights. If Section 78-16-5 or
Subsection 77-35-12(g) or any parts thereof are
held invalid or unconstitutional, this Subsection (2)
shall be void and governmental entities shall remain
immune from suit for violations of fourth amendment rights,
19S5
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APPENDIX D

SALT LAKE COUNTY PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT
DEVELOPMENT SERVICES DIVISION
2033 South State
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
COMMISSIONER
Phone^S^QpCLM. TOM SHIM1ZU

ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR
ff
Public Worti
Romney M. Stewart
488-5448
PROJECT REVIEW
AsxocntB Olrector
Douglas H Campoelf
488-5061
Informitlon Service*
Rooen Cates
488-5000
Plan Strvtcts
Glenn Granam
488-5061

Certified Letter
#P 707 382 907
#P 707 382 908

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC WORKS

MAR 24 1935
COUNTY ATTORNEY
CIVIL DIVISION

March 19, 1986

DONALD G.SPENCER
Professional Engineer
County Engineer

DIRECTOR

KEN JONES
Mr. Dell Bartel
715 East 3900 South, Suite #12
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Mr. Robert DeBry
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, Utah

84107

Gentlemen:
Engineering S e m e n
Brent Tidwell. R.L.S.
488-5448
INSPECTION SERVICES
Carl Eriksson. PJL
488-5000
Chltl Building Qffldal
Wallace R. Noote
488-5000
RECORDS MANAGEMENT
& BUSINESS UCENSE
Alan Rogers
488-5000

SUBJECT: Building Permit required for building at 4252 South
700 East, Salt Lake County, Utah
On March 17, 1986, I made an on-site inspection and found the
following deficiencies that must be corrected and completed
within 30 working days, upon receipt of this letter, in order
to stop any legal action.
Some of the items listed below are self explanatory and some
are of technical nature. I will try to explain the technical
ones in order to assure you understand what is to be done.
1.

Handicap hardware is required in rest rooms on main floor.

2.

All rest rooms will have stall partitions to separate the
fixtures one from another.

3.

All fixtures will be sealed at point of contact with walls
and floors.

4.

A ceiling tile is missing in the library.

5.

Electrical junction boxes are open with no covers for
protection thru out ceiling and floor spaces.

6.

Air conditioners are not completed.

7.

Water is leaking into mens room on second floor thru the
vent fan.

TTv'U A "U4 A.
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Hr. Dell Barter & Mr. Robert DeBry
8.

Stairway is not anchored or finished west side of building
from second floor.

9.

Main stairs in foyer are 12'8 M in rise without a landing to
reduce the long run.

10. Footings are exposed without the required protection east,
west, north, and south sides of building.
11. Window on east side is not protected and is sitting on the
footing of building.
12. The suspended ceiling is not anchored as per seismic
regulations.
13. The light fixtures that are suspended by the ceiling grids
are not anchored per seismic regulations.
14. The areas between the floor and ceiling and the areas
between the ceiling and the roof must be separated into
3,000 sq. ft. areas by a draft stop consisting of at least
1/2" sheet rock.
15. Lateral bracing is called for by plan and must be justified
by the engineer of record that it is in as he called it.
16. The bearing plates called for on the plan are not in place
and must be placed according to the engineer, of record,
specifications.
17. The girder saddles must be bolted as per good workmanship
and as per code. This means if four bolts are called for
then they must be installed with nuts and washers as would
be expected of any bolted connection.
18. Electrical branch panels must have overload protection
breakers installed.
19. Grading and landscaping to be done as per conditional use
permit.
20. The fence is falling and must be redone to assure it will
not fail.
21. Drive approach, curb, gutter and sidewalk to be installed
as per conditional use requirements*
22. The front door foyer is not built as per plan.
23. Engineer calculations are required for plan so permit can
ha Issued.
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24. The plans are to be completed with the corrections as shown
on the plan check sheet.
25. The on-site and off-site requirements are to be bonded as
per attached notice.
26. The permit application shall be filled out and the fees
paid as per the plan check which will include a double fee
for building without a permit.
If you have any questions concerning the above list of
requirements, feel free to contact myself or a plan checker in
our office at any time.
Sincerely,

WALLACE R. NOBLE, Chief Building Official
Development Services Division
WRlT/jb
cc:

Paul Maughn

APPENDIX E

SALT LAKE COUNTY PUBLIC WORXS DEPARTMENT
DEVELOPMENT SERVICES DIVISION
2033 South State
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Phone:488-5000

COMMISSIONER

M.TOMSHIMIZU
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC WORKS
ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR
d
Public Worts
Romney M. Stewart
488-5448
PROJECT REVIEW
Associate Olrtcter
Douglas H Camooell
488-5061

DONALD G. SPENCER
May 1 5 , 1986

Professional Engineer
County Engineer

Mr. Robert J. DeBry
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84107

DIRECTOR
KEN JONES

Dear Mr. DeBry:
Information Services
Rooert Cates
488-5000
Plan Strvicu
Glenn Granam
488-5^1
Enqineerinq Services
Brent Tioweil. RX.S.
488-5448
1NSPECTUW SE3VICES
Carl Enksson, PJL
488-5000
Brief Building Official
Wallace R. Noble
488-5000
RECORDS MANAGEMEMT
a BUSINESS LICENSE
Alan Rogers
488-5000

SUBJECT:

Property located at 4252 South -700 East

As per my letter of March 19, 1986, I am hereby notifying you
that you are in violation of the Building Code for occupying
the building at the above referenced property without a
-Certificate of Occupancy". I have been instructed by the
County Attorney to not make any further inspections of the
building located at the above referenced location until the
building permit is, in fact, taken out. As per your letter and
in answer to the questions therein, I can only say you are
receiving incorrect information. Listed below is the correct
information.
No permit other than the footing and foundation permit has been
issued.
The sub-permits were issued but they were not the ones in
question.
When the permit is in fact taken out we will make the
inspection.
The defects or problems in the building have no bearing on
whether or not a permit will be issued.
The State Department of Contractors has a license listed for
Cascade Construction.

VALLACZ R. NOBLE, Chief Building Official
Development Services Division
WRH/jfc

APPENDIX F

S A L T
D E V E L O P M E N T

LAKE
COUNTY
S E R V I C E S
D I V I S I O N

2033 S o u t h S t a t e S t r e e t
S a l t Lako C i t y , Utah SAMS

Date

i s s u e d

Nov>

C e r t . Mail No.p
Date or S e r v i c e

N O T I C E AND O E D E E
To: Mr. "Robert DeBry
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Re:

Office Building at 4252 South 700 East

Notice:

The referenced building is being occupied in violation of
Section 307 (a) of the Uniform Building Code, in that there
is no valid "Certificate of Occupancy", the "Temporary
Certificate of Occupancy" issued December 6, 1985, has
expired, and the corrections required by this department on
March 19, 1986, subsequent to a requested inspection
performed by this department hayje^nnt ho on -.aje.

Order:

Yoy^-ice hereby ordered to^vacate the building within 10
^ d a v ^ ^ Furthermore, the building shall "rHSliLa.!*: Lrrio-e-eupr
until such time as a valid "Certificate of Occupancy" is
issued.
A "Certificate of Occupancy" will be issued only after
submittal and approval of as-built drawings, certification
from a licensed engineer as to the adequacy of the
structure, payment of all fees prescribed by law, and a
final inspection showing compliance with code requirements.
The final inspection will not be performed until the
aforementioned administrative requirements have been met.
This order is issued under authority of Section 202 (e) of
the Uniform Building Code.

Sincerely,

CARL ERIKSSON, Section Manager
Inspection Services
CE/jb

cc:

Paul Maughn, Deputy County Attorney

APPENDIX G

Notice of Decision

Appeal of Mr. Robert J.
DeBry Regarding Notice
and Order to Vacate

On December 12, 1986, a hearing was held before the Salt Lake County
Board of Appeals at 9:00 a.m. to consider the appeal by Mr. Robert DeBry
of a notice and order issued by Salt Lake County ordering Mr. De3ry to
vacate the building located at 4252 South 700 East in Salt Lake County.

Two items were presented to the Board of Appeals:

(a)

a request for

Salt Lake County to perform an inspection of the building and to info —
Mr. DeBry of building code violations, and (b) a request for an extension
of time in which to vacate the building beyond the ten days allowed by
the Building Official.

The Board heard presentations by Mr. DeBry and others on behalf of
the matters before the Board, heard the presentation on behalf of Salt
Lake County by Mr. Maughan, and heard statements by Mr. Bartel, the
builder of the building.

Having reviewed the written materials presented by Mr. DeBry,
considered the statements made at the hearing, and consulted with and
been advised by Salt Lake City Attorney's Office regarding the issues
presented, the Board of Appeals orders as follows:

-1Exhibit "C"

t.

Br.fitelryi* to craplf trith th« provisions of Mr. Eriksson's

letter of November 17, 1986, before any inspections need be made by the
County.

Specifically, before any further inspections are made, as-built

drawings in sufficient detail,for which a building permit could be
issued, certified by licensed engineers and a licensed architect are
submitted to Salt Lake County.

All required fees are to be paid and a

building permit issued by the County.

2.

Mr. DeBry's request for an extension of time beyond the ten days

set forth in the notice and order dated November 3, 1986, is denied.

The

ten day period shall commence to run as of December 12, 1986.

DATED th is

J) &<C day of

. 19 <rC

A A ^ O

SALT LAKE COUNTY BOARD OF APPEALS

By.

zu

OlA

JLe^

/

Don Wakefield
Chairman

Enclosure
1) November 17th Letter
2) Notice and Order
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